Written for the person whose job is to say no.
Security reviews run on specifics. Here are ours, including the parts still in progress.
This page covers the platform Taiga runs. How the software we deliver is governed lives on governance.
Posture
What holds today, and what does not.
The questions a security review asks first. Some of the answers are no, which is the point: we hold no certifications yet, so the useful thing we can offer is an accurate list rather than a wall of logos.
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| Data residency | EU only. Enforced at the infrastructure boundary by organization-wide guardrails that deny non-EU regions, not by policy alone. The fine print, before you ask: inference may run in more than one EU region for capacity and resilience, nothing persists there and nothing leaves the EU, and the CDN's TLS certificate is managed in a US region because the provider requires it. Certificate metadata only, never customer data. |
| Training on your data | Never. Amazon Bedrock does not train on prompts or outputs, and an organization-wide policy opts us out of AWS AI services using our content. |
| Tenant isolation | PostgreSQL row-level security, deny by default, enforced at the data layer rather than only in the API. |
| Agent controls | Retrieval is scoped to your tenant, agents run least-privilege and are invoked only by the API, and agent output is validated at the API layer. A further Bedrock Guardrails layer, prompt-attack detection and credential, card and national-ID blocking on user-facing agents, is built and versioned but switched off in every environment while support cases with AWS are open. |
| Database credentials | The application has none: it authenticates with short-lived IAM tokens. A master credential exists, managed and rotated by AWS, and is not used by the application. |
| Administrative access | On demand through AWS SSM, opened for the job and gone after it. No SSH, no bastion, no standing paths. |
| Backups | Point-in-time for 30 days in production, encrypted, copied into an isolated account so they survive a compromise of the workload account. |
| Erasure | A tenant owner can instruct it. 30-day cancellable grace, then a purge across every store and a signed deletion certificate. |
| Audit retention | Seven years, in an isolated archive account, immutable. We could not edit it if we wanted to. |
| ISO 27001 | In progress. Not held. The management system is running; the certificate is not ours yet and you will not see the logo here until it is. |
| SOC 2 Type II | Planned. Not held. |
The open rows above change the day they change, and the change is posted on the updates page rather than quietly edited.
The rest of the trust center
Every other page here is public, and none of it is gated. What we can send on request, and the few documents that need an NDA, are listed under Documents.
Ask the question this page did not answer. security@tai.ga
Verified against the Taiga system description and the platform source, 2026-08-13. Corrections are logged on the updates page.